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Abstract	
	
The	punitive	turn	in	Ecuadorian	left‐wing	politics	embodies	a	fundamental	contradiction.	
On	the	one	hand	it	involved	extending	social	rights	and	resisting	neoliberalism.	On	the	other	
hand,	punitive	criminal	 justice	policies	 intensified.	This	paper	explores	what,	how,	when	
and	why	this	occurred	to	explain	the	complexity	of	Ecuador’s	punitive	turn	under	a	period	
of	twenty‐first	century	socialism.	Two	eras	of	national	policy	will	be	compared.	The	first	is	
known	as	the	‘long	neoliberal	night’	(the	before);	while	the	second	is	known	as	the	‘Citizens'	
Revolution’	(the	present).	The	Citizens’	Revolution	replaced	neoliberal	policies	with	social	
development,	 infrastructure,	 services	 and	 programs	 alongside	 the	 more	 equitable	
distribution	of	wealth.	 In	a	first	moment,	 it	also	deployed	strategies	and	actions	towards	
penal	 moderation.	 However,	 since	 2010,	 it	 has	 changed	 dramatically,	 generating	 an	
astonishing	 punitive	 turn.	 The	 article	 concludes	 that	 law	 and	 order	 policies	 in	 Ecuador	
therefore	 do	 not	 fit	 Loïc	 Wacquant’s	 (2013:	 22)	 description	 of	 the	 ‘neoliberal	 penal	
paradox’.		
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Introduction:	‘The	Ecuadorian	miracle’	
Despite	being	one	of	 the	 first	 countries	 to	 return	 to	 the	 rule	of	 law	 in	1979,	Ecuador	has	not	
enjoyed	a	sustainable	ending	to	any	of	its	presidential	periods	in	recent	history.	In	1981,	the	year	
that	the	rule	of	law	was	established,	Jaime	Roldós,	the	first	civil	president	after	several	military	
governments,	died	in	a	mysterious	plane	crash.	From	1984	to	1996,	León	Febres	Cordero,	Rodrigo	
Borja	and	Sixto	Durán	Ballén	did	conclude	their	administrations.	However,	from	1996	to	2006	
there	were	 three	coups	and	 ten	presidents:	Abdalá	Bucaram,	Rosalía	Arteaga,	Fabián	Alarcón,	
Jamil	Mahuad,	Lucio	Gutiérrez,	Antonio	Vargas,	Carlos	Solórzano,	Gustavo	Noboa,	Alfredo	Palacio,	
and	finally,	Rafael	Correa.	
	
The	 period	 was	 subsequently	 labelled	 the	 ‘long	 neoliberal	 night’	 by	 the	 current	 government	
(Correa	2009:	37).	Within	this	period	there	was	a	‘bank	holiday’	that	caused	hyperinflation	and,	
more	acutely,	a	severe	economic	crisis;	the	national	currency,	the	Sucre,	was	converted	into	the	
American	dollar;	neoliberal	law	enforcement	was	designed	by	bankers;	and	there	was	an	exodus	
of	over	three	million	Ecuadorians	to	countries	like	Spain	and	Italy.	The	constant	schisms	between	
voters	has	resulted	in	three	constitutions	in	less	than	29	years	of	democracy:	the	Constitution	of	
1979;	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	1998;	and,	finally,	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	
2008,	also	often	referred	to	as	the	‘Constitution	of	Montecristi’.	
	
Rafael	 Correa’s	 government	 reduced	 inequality,	 decreasing	 the	 Gini	 coefficient	 on	 income	
distribution	(where	0	corresponds	with	perfect	equality	and	1	with	perfect	inequality)	by	8	points	
(Correa	2014).	From	2006	to	2013	poverty	fell	from	37.6	per	cent	to	25.6	per	cent,	while	extreme	
poverty	 decreased	 to	 less	 than	 two	 digits,	 from	 16.9	 per	 cent	 to	 8.6	 per	 cent	 (Correa	 2014).	
Additionally,	 vast	 educational,	 health,	 energy	 and	 road	 infrastructure	 improvements	 were	
undertaken	by	the	political	process	known	as	the	‘Citizens’	Revolution’.	The	Citizens’	Revolution’s	
main	 platform	 was	 for	 State	 efficiency,	 meaning	 the	 return	 to	 a	 policy	 of	 constitutional	
administration.	 This	 policy	 had	previously	 earned	 positive	 recognition	 for	 the	 government	 in	
addition	 to	 receiving	 international	 praise	 for	 economic	 development,	 which	 was	 coined	 ‘the	
Ecuadorian	miracle’.	
	
Spreading	social	rights	and	the	denial	of	neoliberalism	are	notoriously	leftist	political	projects.	In	
spite	of	this,	contrasting	punitive	social	control	manifestations	were	also	presented.	Ecuador’s	
politics	 at	 the	 time	 were	 complex	 and	 unique	 and	 did	 not	 fit	 Loïc	 Wacquant’s	 (2013:	 22)	
description	of	the	‘neoliberal	penal	paradox’,	in	which	the	sine	qua	non	condition	for	increasing	
penalties	is	the	State’s	impotence	to	confront	neoliberalist	economic	advances.	On	the	contrary,	
the	Citizens’	Revolution	pleaded	for	a	break	with	neoliberalism,	to	be	replaced	by	infrastructure	
and	 services	programs,	 not	 charity	 or	 through	unpaid	 reemployment	programs	 (workfare)	 in	
exchange	for	State	income.	
	
What,	how,	when,	how	much	and	why	are	some	of	the	questions	that	will	be	addressed	in	this	
paper	that	seeks	to	describe	and	explain	Ecuador’s	punitive	turn.	Two	eras	of	national	policy	will	
be	compared.	The	first	is	known	as	the	‘long	neoliberal	night’	(the	before);	while	the	second	is	
known	as	the	‘Citizens'	Revolution’	(the	present).	Additionally	it	is	necessary	to	identify	at	least	
two	phases	during	the	Citizens’	Revolution	era,	in	which	the	attempted	coup	on	30	September	
2010	by	the	National	Police	functioned	as	the	defining	line	between	the	two.	
	
Punishment	during	the	‘long	neoliberal	night’	
The	long	neoliberal	night	is	comprised	of	a	period	of	(poor)	governance	between	1996	and	2006.3	
It	 is	 characterized	 by	 an	 economic	 crisis	 and	 concomitant	 political	 instability.	 The	 crisis	 and	
instability	 were	 accompanied	 by	 the	 implementation	 of	 neoliberalism,	 which	 reduced	 the	
position	 of	 the	 State	 due	 to	 significant	 external	 debt	 and	 a	 wave	 of	 privatization	 of	 public	
enterprises	and	services.	The	condition	provoked	State	decapitalization,	monetary	devaluation,	
public	debt	and	the	submission	to	international	financial	capital,	hyperinflation	and	alarmingly	
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high	unemployment	numbers,	an	exodus	of	its	population	to	other	countries,	corruption,	and	a	
steady	weakening	of	public	institutions.	
	
In	2000,	during	the	boom	that	was	favorable	for	the	market	economy,	the	national	currency,	the	
Sucre,	 was	 converted	 into	 the	 US	 dollar	 (equivalent	 to	 25,000	 Sucres).	 In	 the	 same	 year	 the	
European	 scriptural‐inquisitorial	 procedural	 model	 was	 transformed	 into	 an	 Anglo‐American	
oral‐accusatory	model.	The	promulgation	of	the	new	Code	of	Criminal	Procedure4	received	over	
US$1.5	 million	 in	 funds	 as	 an	 initiative	 from	 the	 United	 States	 Agency	 for	 International	
Development	(USAID)	(Sarles	2001)	and,	in	so	doing,	established	itself	as	the	emblem	of	judicial	
reform	 at	 the	 time.	 The	 changes	 in	 Ecuador	 coincided	 with	 a	 circuit	 of	 reforms	 that	 were	
implemented	in	other	countries	such	as	Guatemala	(1994),	Costa	Rica	(1998),	El	Salvador	(1999),	
Paraguay	(1999),	Venezuela	(1999)	and	Chile	(2000).	
	
The	 transfer	 of	 the	 new	 procedural	 theory	 penetrated	 the	 judicial	 structures	 underneath	 the	
system’s	concept.	That	is	to	say,	it	politically	blamed	the	previous	model	for	the	administrative	
(dis)function	 (Schünemann	 2002).	 In	 doing	 so,	 not	 only	 the	 American	 economic	 model	 was	
emulated	 but	 also	 its	 criminal	 procedural	 tradition	 (Langer	 2008).5	 So,	 the	 reform	 began	 by	
securing	 the	Official	 Investigation	Model	 (Langer	 2001)	 but,	 in	 less	 than	 a	 year,	 Ecuador	had	
shielded	 its	 tax	structure	 through	the	enactment	of	 the	Organic	Law	of	 the	Public	Prosecutor's	
Office	in	2001.	The	Public	Prosecutor's	Office	not	only	held	a	special	position	within	the	criminal	
justice	system	but	also	exerted	influence	on	the	media	(Paladines	2009).	
	
The	penal	reform	was	accompanied	by	a	critical	discourse	on	preventive	detention.	A	year	before	
its	implementation,	69	per	cent	of	the	prison	population	had	not	been	sentenced;	that	is,	out	of	
8,520	detainees,	 only	2,507	had	been	 convicted.	After	 the	 reform,	 the	 first	Assessment	of	 the	
Criminal	 Procedural	 System	 in	 Ecuador	 (Fundación	 Esquel‐USAID	 2003)	 revealed	 that	 the	
percentage	of	detainees	without	a	conviction	increased	by	7	per	cent.	This	turnaround	occurred	
despite	 the	 fact	 that,	up	until	 four	years	before	 the	 implementation	of	 the	criminal	procedure	
reform,	the	incarceration	rates	had	been	on	the	decrease,	down	from	9,961	detainees	in	1996	to	
8,029	in	2000	(Table	1).	The	reform,	however,	checked	the	decrease.	As	will	later	be	shown	the	
incarceration	rate	varied	between	64	and	104	per	100,000	inhabitants	between	2002	and	2006.	
In	other	words,	from	the	start	of	the	reform,	the	trend	in	incarceration	rates	was	upwards.	
	
Table	1:	Prison	population	ten	years	before	the	2000	criminal	procedure	reform	
Year	 Sentenced	 Percentage	 Not	sentenced	 Percentage	
Total	
detainees	
1990	 2275	 29.63	 5,404	 70.37	 7,679	
1991	 2373	 30.10	 5,511	 69.90	 7,884	
1992	 2473	 30.96	 5,525	 69.17	 7,998	
1993	 2845	 32.25	 6,000	 67.75	 8,856	
1994	 2745	 30.29	 6,319	 69.72	 9,064	
1995	 3225	 33.43	 6,451	 66.57	 9,646	
1996	 3078	 31.86	 6,883	 71.36	 9,961	
1997	 3094	 30.94	 6,412	 67.46	 9,506	
1998	 2405	 26.56	 6,650	 73.44	 9,439	
1999	 2507	 30.60	 5,688	 69.40	 8,520	
2000	 2946	 36.70	 5,083	 63.31	 8,029	
Source:	Dirección	Nacional	de	Rehabilitación	Social	(DNRS)	(2010)	
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Meanwhile,	 the	 Penal	 Code	 of	 1938	 had	 remained	 almost	 unchanged,	 thus	 preserving	 classic	
‘social	defense’	offenses	that	criminalized	begging,	vagrancy	and	homosexuality.	However,	one	
year	after	the	enactment	of	the	criminal	procedure	reform	in	2001,	punishments	were	increased	
for	certain	crimes.	Law	No.	2001‐47,	for	example,	increased	the	maximum	penalty,	which,	since	
the	 Liberal	 Revolution	 in	 1895	 when	 the	 death	 penalty	 was	 abolished,	 had	 remained	 at	 a	
maximum	of	sixteen	years	for	homicide	(Raub	1986).	The	new	punishment	scale	increased	the	
maximum	penalty	to	25	years,	to	be	accumulated	up	to	35	years	of	imprisonment.6	Then	in	2005,	
along	with	the	penalty	increase	for	murder,	penalties	hardened	for	rape	cases,7	crimes	that	fell	
under	the	Law	on	Narcotic	and	Psychotropic	Substances	(Act	108),	and	others,	such	as	aggravated	
robbery	resulting	in	death.	
	
Moreover,	 the	 long	neoliberal	night	between	2000	and	2006	hardened	preventative	detention	
measures	(see	Figure	1).	On	13	January	2003	an	exception	was	established	in	the	chapter	in	which	
the	most	severe	precautionary	measure	was	established.	Through	the	so‐called	‘firm	detention	
measure’	an	amendment	was	made	to	Law	2003‐101	which	established	that	provisional	arrest	
could	be	extended	indefinitely.	The	amendment	violated	the	Constitution	of	1998,	which,	under	
paragraph	8	of	Article	24,	outlawed	preventative	imprisonment	of	more	than	six	months	and,	in	
extreme	 cases,	 one	 year.	 Some	months	 earlier,	 the	media	 had	 insinuated	 that	 the	 use	 of	 this	
reasonable	period	resulted	 in	 the	release	of	 ‘criminals’;8	 removing	 the	procedural	statute	 that	
violated	the	constitution	therefore	became	difficult.	Three	years	elapsed	before	the	Constitutional	
Court	declared	Law	2003‐101	–	a	 law	that	allowed	for	arrests	without	a	reasonable	detention	
timeframe	and	 for	arrests	without	even	being	 firmly	condemned9	–	 to	be	unconstitutional.	 Its	
resolution,	however,	had	no	retroactive	effects.	
	
	
		
Figure	1:	Movement	(per	cent)	in	persons	incarcerated	in	Ecuador,	1990‐2006	
Source:	Carranza	(2012)	
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Punishment	during	the	‘Citizens’	Revolution’	
For	 years,	 oil	 companies,	 international	 cooperation,	 traditional	 parties,	 financial	 groups	 and	
interference	 from	 other	 nations	 had	 had	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 Ecuadorian	 economy.	 A	 young	
‘outsider’	economist,	Rafael	Correa	Delgado,	broke	through	with	a	new	discourse	that	promised	
to	 ‘restore	 hope	 amongst	 Ecuadorians’.	 Under	 his	 leadership	 the	 Citizens’	 Revolution,	 which	
proposed	State	recovery	through	a	new	institutional	 framework	aimed	at	 (de)corporatization,	
was	 born.	When	Delgado	 became	 president	 of	 the	 republic	 in	 2006,	 he	 formed	 a	 Constituent	
Assembly	in	the	city	of	Montecristi.	On	20	October	2008	Ecuador	released	a	new	constitution	that	
inaugurated	‘Good	Living’	or	Sumak	Kawsay	as	a	social	pact,	recognizing	norms	and	policies	for	
groups	 that	 had	 historically	 been	 vulnerable,	 among	 which	 were	 persons	 deprived	 of	 their	
liberty.10	Within	this	context	the	Citizen’s	Revolution’s	criminal	policy	was	developed,	which	later	
came	to	be	differentiated	as	passing	through	two	opposing	phases.	Firstly,	during	the	first	three	
years	of	government	(2007‐2009),	there	was	the	so‐called	‘State	Guarantee’	phase,	characterized	
by	the	deepening	of	the	constitutional	State	with	regard	to	rights	and	justice.	Secondly,	from	2010	
onwards,	there	was	the	so‐called	‘Police	State’	which	was	characterized	by	penalty	inflation.	The	
structures	and	agencies	that	were	emphasized	in	criminal	policy	in	each	phase	will	be	described	
here.	They	differed	to	the	point	that	a	contradiction	deepened,	which	revealed	the	punitive	turn	
of	the	left‐wing	in	the	Ecuadorian	government.		
	
The	first	phase:	State	Guarantees	
In	 an	 attempt	 to	generate	 institutional	 renewal	 from	scratch,	 the	elections	 in	2006	 led	 to	 the	
presidency	 of	 Rafael	 Correa	 without	 any	 pro‐government	 deputies.11	 The	 intention	 was	 to	
provoke	political	separation	from	the	‘old	power’	in	order	to	introduce	a	new	chapter.	It	began	
with	the	convocation	of	a	Constituent	Assembly	in	2007	in	order	to	achieve	the	de‐legitimization	
of	the	traditional	political	parties.	In	the	constitutional	debate,	the	young	government	proposed	
granting	 a	 general	 pardon	 to	 so‐called	 ‘drug‐mules’.	 On	 4	 July	 2008	 –	 coinciding	 with	
Independence	Day	in	the	United	States	–	the	Constituent	Assembly	suspended	the	punishments	
of	prisoners	who	had	carried	up	to	2,000	grams	of	any	illegal	drug.12	The	pardon	resulted	in	the	
release	 of	 2,223	 individuals,	 of	 which	 less	 than	 2	 per	 cent	 relapsed	 (Defensoría	 Pública	 del	
Ecuador	[Public	Defender's	Office]	2010).	The	ruling	mainly	benefited	detained	women,	where	
the	majority	of	those	in	prison	had	been	sentenced	for	this	type	of	crime.13	Rafael	Correa	therefore	
pointed	out:	
	
We	will	request	a	general	pardon	from	the	Constituent	Assembly	for	drug	mules,	
men	 and	women,	 and	 the	 drug	 law	will	 also	 be	 revised,	 there	where	 it	 has	 no	
relation	 to	 crime	 ...	 The	 Law	 [108]	was	 adopted	 in	 the	 early	 nineties	 after	 the	
United	States	imposed	it	on	all	Latin	American	countries,	and	here	as	always	our	
legislators,	our	leaders	took	it	with	enthusiasm.	(El	Universo	2007)14	
	
The	initiative	questioned	criminal	drug	policy	by	showing	that	much	of	the	penal	system	is	aimed	
at	 investigating	 and	 punishing	 the	 weakest	 links,	 with	 serious	 suspicions	 that	 a	 significant	
number	of	detainees	could	be	mere	consumers	(Paladines	2014a).	In	2009,	for	example,	one	year	
after	the	implementation	of	the	general	pardon,	more	than	34	per	cent	of	the	prison	population	
in	 Ecuador	 had	 been	 arrested	 for	 drug	 related	 offenses	 (Figure	 2).	 Drug	 offenses	 were	
accountable	for	the	largest	incarceration	component.	
	
But	criminal	policy	began	to	provoke	by	focusing	on	one	of	the	most	aberrant	phenomena	within	
the	 punitive	 discourse.	 Specifically,	 the	 Constituent	 Assembly	 adopted	 the	 constitutional	
principle	 that	 prohibited	 the	 criminalization	 of	 drug	 users.	 In	 other	 words,	 what	 in	 other	
countries	was	defined	in	jurisprudence	or	public	policy,	 in	Ecuador	became	established	under	
Article	364	of	the	new	Constitution,	which	stated:	
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Figure	2:	Prison	population	per	type	of	offense	in	Ecuador,	2009	
Source:	Sistema	de	Gestión	de	la	Defensa	Pública	(SGDP)	(2009)	
	
Addiction	 is	 a	 public	 health	 issue.	 The	 State	 shall	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	
development	of	coordinated	programs	that	aim	to	inform,	prevent	and	control	the	
use	of	alcohol,	narcotic	and	psychotropic	substances;	as	well	as	offer	treatment	and	
rehabilitation	for	occasional,	regular	and	problem	users.	In	no	case	should	they	be	
criminalized	nor	should	their	constitutional	rights	be	violated	[emphasis	added].	
	
By	promoting	Guarantee	institutions,15	the	new	constitution	created	an	innovative	articulation	of	
the	role	between	State	and	society.	In	November	2007	the	Ministry	of	Justice	and	Human	Rights	
was	created	to	manage	and	develop	penitentiary	policy	which	historically	had	fallen	under	the	
responsibilities	of	the	Home	Office.16	Additionally,	to	fill	the	institutional	vacuum,	the	Ecuadorian	
Public	Defense	Office	was	created	in	August	2007	and	obtained	recognition	and	constitutional	
autonomy	 in	 2008.	 From	 2008	 to	 2014,	 the	 Ecuadorian	 Public	 Defense	 Office	 increased	 its	
number	 of	 staff	 to	 767	 Public	 Defenders	 nationwide	 (Defensoría	 Pública	 del	 Ecuador	 [Public	
Defender's	Office]	2014).	
	
Soon	the	general	pardon,	 the	construction	of	Guarantee	 institutions,	 the	policies	and	the	 legal	
reforms	began	to	have	an	effect	by	reducing	incarceration	rates.	Added	to	this	was	the	expiration	
of	preventative	detention	for	thousands	of	detainees	who	had	not	been	convicted,	in	addition	to	
the	implementation	of	 ‘prison	benefits’	such	as	pre‐liberties	and	sentence	reduction.	The	State	
Guarantee	reduced	the	prison	population	by	more	than	40	per	cent,	from	a	rate	of	130	(in	2007)	
to	73	(in	2009)	detainees	per	100,000	inhabitants.	Thus,	the	imprisonment	trend	diminished	in	
absolute	 numbers	 from	 18,675	 detainees	 to	 10,881	 (see	 Figure	 3).	 The	 State	 recovery	 and	
criticism	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 model	 began	 to	 make	 sense,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 lower	 levels	 of	
punitivism.	
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Figure	3:	Number	of	persons	incarcerated	in	Ecuador,	2007‐2009	
Source:	Ministerio	de	Justicia,	Derechos	Humanos	y	Cultos	[Ministry	of	Justice,	Human	Rights	and	Affairs]	
(2013b)	
	
For	 the	 first	 time	 the	State	Guarantee	 set	a	precedent	by	 remembering	 the	crimes	committed	
against	humanity,	especially	during	the	presidential	term	of	León	Febres	Cordero	(1984‐1988).	
These	developments	are	in	line	with	Samuel	Huntington’s	(2000)	‘third	wave	of	democratization’;	
that	is,	the	transition	that	devolves	upon	new	rulers	when	expressing	judgment	about	the	human	
rights	violations	of	 their	predecessors.	The	Doctrine	of	National	Security	was	 implemented	 in	
Latin	 America	 to	 combat	 communism	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 1960s,	 and	 Ecuador	 experienced	 a	
spectacular	resurgence	in	forms	of	State	violence	between	1984	and	1988.	Thus,	during	Rafael	
Correa’s	first	term	of	government,	a	Truth	Commission	was	formed	to	investigate	crimes	against	
humanity	 committed	 during	 that	 period.	 17	 The	 report	 inferred	 a	 high	 level	 of	 involvement	 –	
nearly	50	per	cent	–	of	both	passive	and	active	personnel	within	the	law	enforcement	agency.	The	
commission	therefore	stated:	
	
The	main	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn	from	the	presented	results	is	that	it	has	
become	evident	that	these	State	actors	chose	to	move	away	from	the	legal	system	
and	instrumented	perverse	forms	of	violence	in	an	intent	to	take	the	application	of	
the	law	into	their	own	hands,	in	an	inadmissible	misunderstanding	that	violence	is	
a	resource	of	justice.	In	most	cases,	they	did	so	under	the	State	policy	applied	under	
León	Febres	Cordero’s	government	which	encouraged	and	supported	repressive	
systematic	solutions	to	deal	with	issues	of	social	unrest;	in	others,	over	the	course	
of	various	governments	 through	sporadic	actions	–	 in	expressions	of	autonomy	
that	are	presumed	to	have	respect	for	the	legal	order	–	members	of	the	Police	and	
the	Armed	Forces	 equally	 violated	 citizens’	 rights	 and	 the	protection	of	 human	
rights.	(Comisión	de	la	Verdad	[Truth	Commission]	2010:	121)	
	
The	State	Guarantee	revised	criminal	law	in	March	2009.18	The	National	Assembly	advocated	for	
a	 reform	that	reduced	penalties	 for	crimes	against	property	as	well	as	 introducing	preventive	
detention.19	Additionally,	a	new	criminal	policy	program	was	devised	under	the	Constitution	of	
Montecristi’s	‘criminal	law	program’,	which	converted	theft	into	a	violation	if	the	total	financial	
amount	was	less	than	the	equivalent	of	three	months	of	basic	pay	according	to	workers’	rights.	
Furthermore,	 twelve	 personal	 precautionary	 measures	 were	 established	 in	 relation	 to	
preventative	detention	in	order	to	prevent	judicial	abuse;	and	the	crime	of	‘check	writing	without	
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the	provision	of	funds’	was	decriminalized	and	established	instead	as	a	classic	type	of	crime	which	
transgressed	the	Constitutional	‘no	imprisonment	for	debt’	principle	(Paladines	2010).	
	
The	reform,	which	was	published	in	the	Official	Register	555	of	24	March	2009,	brought	about	
other	issues.	These	included,	amongst	others,	new	organic	principles	and	procedural	safeguards	
such	 as	 minimal	 intervention	 and	 due	 process;	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 competences	 of	
procedural	participants;	the	change	from	the	nomenclature	of	judges	and	the	criminal	court	to	
judge’	and	criminal	court’	guarantees,	as	well	as	from	accused	to	indicted;	and	the	change	from	
public	action	to	private	action	against	certain	crimes.	The	State	Guarantees	culminated	the	year	
of	2009	with	the	publication	of	the	Preliminary	Organic	Code	of	Criminal	Guarantees	(OCCG).In	
addition	to	reducing	punishment,	the	OCCG	managed	to	establish	an	impressive	bridge	between	
substantive,	adjectival	and	executive	criminal	laws.	Guided	by	the	minimum	criminal	law	trend,	
it	gathered	together	more	than	730	criminal	laws	and	formulated	them	in	the	national	law.	The	
draft	 legitimized	 the	 governance	 of	 academic,	 social	 and	 political	 spaces	 to	 renew	 orthodox	
punishment	from	a	Garantist	paradigm	and	from	a	legitimate	base.	
	
The	second	phase:	The	Police	State	
The	second	phase	is	marked	by	events	that	emerged	from	the	attempted	coup	of	30	September	
2010.	The	scenario	–	according	to	official	sources	–	was	initiated	by	a	general	police	riot	and	the	
alleged	kidnapping	of	the	president	from	a	hospital	for	possible	assassination.	It	is	still	not	clear	
who	the	instigators	were,	despite	dozens	of	ongoing	criminal	proceedings.20	Whereas	previously	
it	was	the	armed	forces	that	had	overthrown	democratic	governments,	this	time,	31	years	after	
the	 restoration	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 Ecuador,	 it	 was	 the	 nation’s	 police	 that	 generated	 a	
conjuncture	with	similar	effects.21	
	
Months	 before,	 the	 media	 and	 politicians	 of	 the	 opposition	 had	 entered	 into	 a	 full‐blown	
campaign	against	the	2009	legislative	reform.	The	government	was	accused	of	encouraging	crime	
and	promoting	impunity,	which	was	accompanied	by	press	releases	that	exacerbated	occurrences	
of	robberies	and	homicides.22	The	criticism	of	the	reduction	of	punishments	in	relation	to	crimes	
against	property,	as	well	as	preventative	detention	alternatives,	was	echoed	by	some	authorities	
that	were	aligned	to	the	government.	These	authorities	generally	questioned	the	maturity	of	the	
reform,	 as	 stressed,	 for	 example,	 by	 the	 then	 Attorney	 General,	Washington	 Pesantez,23	 who	
claimed	to	be	close	to	the	president.	
	
While	differing	position	were	presented	within	the	government	in	relation	to	punishment,	the	
citizenry	 –	 especially	 the	middle	 class	 –	 found	 itself	 in	 a	 punitive	discourse	 generated	by	 the	
media,	which	began	to	assume	a	level	of	social	significance	(Garland	2006).	It	appeared	that	the	
middle	class,	in	addition	to	having	expanded,	began	to	share	the	moral	panic	of	the	upper	class.	
Patterns	similar	to	the	responses	to	the	2009	reform	began	to	appear:	the	political	project	of	the	
Citizen’s	 Revolution	 was	 threatened	 because	 it	 distorted	 the	 wealth	 distribution	 benefits,	
rewarding	 criminals;	 the	middle	 class	 began	 to	 share	 the	 selfishness	 of	 the	 upper	 classes	 in	
relation	to	the	ownership	of	private	property	 instead	of	adopting	humane	and	compassionate	
values;	 and	 it	 seemed	 that	 victimization	 was	 more	 likely	 to	 occur	 in	 their	 class	 than	 before	
(Garland	2007).	
	
The	National	Assembly,	stimulated	by	the	Executive,	retracted	from	the	2009	reform	a	year	after	
its	 execution.	After	 its	 publication	 in	 the	Official	 Register	 160	of	 29	March	2010,	 the	 counter	
reform	proposed:	i)	a	modification	to	consider	theft	a	misdemeanour	irrespective	of	the	amount;	
ii)	 establishment	 of	 a	 count	 and	 a	 register	 of	 all	 prosecuted	 prisoner	 in	 order	 to	 exempt	 the	
preventative	detention	fiscal	petition;	and	iii)	a	penalty	increase	for	murder	if	committed	against	
members	of	the	Army	or	Police.	The	discrediting	of	the	2009	legislative	reform	tied	the	conflict	to	
the	new	constitution.	It	was	the	president	of	the	Republic	who	argued	that	the	Constitution	of	
Montecristi	 had	 surpassed	 its	 own	 Garantist	 standards,	 and	 therefore	 approached	 a	 state	 of	
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‘hypergarantism’.24	The	criticism	led	Rafael	Correa	to	call	for	a	referendum	to	reduce	some	of	the	
guarantees,	 including	the	principle	that	established	preventive	detention	as	a	 ‘last	resort’.	The	
tirade	did	 not	 focus	 on	 the	 abuse	 of	 preventive	 detention	but	 rather	 the	 abuse	 of	 alternative	
measures,	which	made	it	necessary	for	the	government	to	reform	the	judicial	function.	It	is	in	this	
2011	context	that,	after	holding	the	portfolio	of	justice,	Dr	José	Serrano	Salgado	arrived	at	the	
Home	Office.	This	was	the	man	who	would	later	incarnate	the	‘Iron	Fist’	against	insecurity	and	
crime	within	the	government.25		
	
On	7	May	2011	the	referendum	took	place.	Among	other	constitutional	amendments,	it	enabled	
the	establishment	of	a	Transitional	Judicial	Council	of	(TJC).	The	TJC	was	established	for	eighteen	
months	under	the	presidential	motto	that	it	was	necessary	to	‘reach	into	the	courts’.26	The	council	
was	composed	of	members	appointed	by	the	executive,	the	legislative,	and	the	Transparency	and	
Social	Control	power.	Its	jurisdiction	also	constituted	of	the	reorganization	of	the	judiciary,	both	
with	regard	to	infrastructure	and	the	bureaucracy.	Among	the	missions	that	stood	out	was	the	
more	expeditious	acting	of	criminal	justice	through	at	least	two	central	policies:	a)	the	elimination	
of	 failed	hearings;	and	b)	 the	creation	of	 ‘Interinstitutional	Flagrante	Delicto	Units’	 (Flagrancy	
Units)	to	avoid	impunity.	
	
So,	as	with	the	Permanent	Justice	Units	of	Colombia,	a	new	procedural	management	model	for	in	
flagrante	delicto	crime	detention	management	was	implemented	in	Ecuador	on	29	October	2012.	
The	 main	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Flagrancy	 Units	 were	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	
institutions	responsible	for	detention	management	to	start	with	the	communication	between	the	
police	agencies	and	other	Judicial	agencies,27	and	new	litigation	protocols	–	‘management	models’	
–	by	way	of	a	new	 judicial	culture	 that	was	prone	to	 the	use	of	special	procedures	(Paladines	
2013).	The	TJC	held:	
	
The	main	objective	of	this	project	[Interinstitutional	Flagrante	Delicto	Units]	is	to	
multiply	the	number	of	cases	that	go	to	trial	and	respond	to	the	citizens’	clamor	to	
reduce	 impunity	 and	 contribute	 to	 improve	 security.	 (Comisión	 de	 la	 Verdad	
[Truth	Commission]	2013:	185)	
	
The	 rapid	 increase	 of	 the	 incarceration	 rate,	 became	 even	 further	 engrained	 due	 to	 the	
establishment	of	the	Flagrancy	Units	and	the	Iron	Fist	of	the	Home	Office	to	combat	crime.	At	the	
same	time	the	efficiency	of	the	police	 force	was	 taken	for	granted.	 In	 less	than	four	years,	 the	
incarceration	 rate	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants	 increased	 from	73	 (in	 2010)	 to	 165	 (in	 2014),	 an	
increase	of	over	120	per	cent.	In	absolute	numbers	this	meant	that,	in	2014,	there	were	13,155	
prisoners	 more	 than	 in	 2010	 (see	 Figure	 4),	 a	 peak	 that	 was	 even	 greater	 than	 the	 one	
experienced	during	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 long	neoliberal	 night	 between	2000	 and	 2006.	 In	 fact,	 the	
number	of	registered	prisoners	in	2014	was	an	all‐time	record	for	the	Ecuadorian	republic.		
	
The	 increase	 in	 the	 incarceration	 rate	 also	 coincided	 with	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 homicide	 rate.	
According	 to	 the	 Ministries	 of	 Interior	 and	 Security,	 the	 reduction	 reached	 plausible	 levels,	
decreasing	from	18.88	(2008),	18.74	(2009)	17.57	(2010),	15.36	(2011),	12.40	(2012)	and	10.87	
(2013)	to	8.30	(2014)	per	100,000	inhabitants	(Coordinator	of	the	Ministry	of	Security,	CEASI	
Statistics	2014).28	This	reduction	did	not	seek	 to	 justify	 the	 increase	 in	 the	prison	population,	
given	 that	most	prisoners	are	not	detained	 for	murder	cases.	However,	 Interior	Minister	 José	
Serrano	did	attribute	the	reduction	in	homicides	to	police	procedures,	especially	in	the	field	of	
counter‐narcotics:	
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Figure	4:	Number	of	registered	prisoners	in	Ecuador,	2010‐2014	
Source:	Ministry	of	Justice,	Human	Rights	and	Affairs		
	
On	an	international	level	it	is	the	general	rule	that	the	more	drug	seizures	there	
are	the	more	crime	continues,	here	in	Ecuador	we	are	breaking	that	rule	because	
since	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 drug	 seizures,	 fewer	 murders	 have	 occurred.	
(Ministerio	del	Interior	[Home	Office]	2015)29	
	
The	phase	of	the	Police	State	has	been	characterized	by	the	modernization	of	prisons.	The	Justice	
portfolio	responded	to	the	growth	of	the	prison	sector	by	adopting	a	costly	and	challenging	policy	
in	 line	 with	 the	 Republican	 administrations	 of	 the	 United	 States	 (Wacquant	 2010).	 This	was	
essentially	 through	 the	 construction	 of	 three	 major	 regional	 detention	 centers	 at	 Guayaquil	
(Guayas),	 Latacunga	 (Cotopaxi)	 and	 Turi	 (Azuay),	 with	 a	 total	 cost	 of	 US$370	million.	 These	
prisons	had	the	capacity	to	accommodate	around	40,000	prisoners	and	were	aimed	at	averting	
possible	 overcrowding	 by	 increasing	 the	 quotas	 and	 prison	 spaces.30	 Several	 rumors	 were	
circulating	about	the	new	prison	infrastructure.	The	truth	is	that	detainees	were	not	allowed	to	
wear	normal	clothing	(Wacquant	2013);	additionally	a	cafeteria	was	provided	in	an	attempt	to	
avoid	the	use	of	money	and	illegal	access	to	goods.	
	
In	the	same	vein,	the	justice	portfolio	created	a	new	security	level	of	liberty	deprivation	–	coined	
the	‘special	maximum	security’	–	in	order	to	regulate	life	within	Ecuadorian	prisons.	The	justice	
portfolio	 was	 able	 to	 implement	 the	 new	 level	 through	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Ecuadorian	
Penitentiary	Management	Model	in	May	2013	which	covered	topics	that	had	previously	not	been	
included	in	Article	694	of	the	Integral	Organic	Criminal	Code	(IOCC).	As	a	consequence,	prisoners	
held	 in	 these	 special	maximum	 security	 wings	 faced	 even	more	 restrictions	 than	 those	 with	
maximum,	medium	and	minimum	security.	Table	2	provides	an	outline	of	a	typical	daily	activity	
schedule.		
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Table	2:	Activities	schedule,	Monday	to	Friday,	in	Ecuador’s	special	maximum	security	
wings	
Time		 	Activity	
06:00	 Lights	turned	on.	Stretching	exercises	in	the	bedrooms.	
06:30	 Personal	hygiene	and	cleaning	of	the	bedrooms.	
07:00	 Attendance	list	is	passed	around	in	the	bedrooms.	In	case	an	absence	is	noted	the	
established	protocol	is	put	into	action.		
08:00	 Breakfast	 is	 served	 in	the	bedrooms.	The	prisoners	hand	 in	 their	dishes	and/or	
utensils.		
09:00	 Start	 of	 activities	 organized	 by	 the	 Treatment	 and	 Education	 team.	 Only	 those	
individuals	can	leave	their	bedroom	that	have	a	specific	treatment	activity,	for	the	
time	that	this	activity	takes	up.	When	the	activity	is	completed	the	prisoner	returns	
to	their	bedroom.		
12:00	 Lunch	is	served	in	the	bedroom.	The	prisoners	hand	in	their	dishes	and/or	utensils.
14:00	 Start	 of	 activities	 organized	 by	 the	 Treatment	 and	 Education	 team.	 Only	 those	
individuals	can	leave	their	bedroom	that	have	a	specific	treatment	activity,	for	the	
time	that	this	activity	takes	up.	When	the	activity	is	completed	the	prisoner	returns	
to	their	bedroom.		
17:00	 Bedrooms	are	closed	for	personal	hygiene.	
18:00	 A	light	meal	is	served	in	the	bedrooms.	The	prisoners	hand	in	their	dishes	and/or	
utensils.	
18:30	 Attendance	list	is	passed	around	in	the	bedrooms.	In	case	an	absence	is	noted	the	
established	protocol	is	put	into	action.	
19:00	 Stretching	exercises	in	the	bedrooms	and	personal	hygiene.	
21:00	 Lights	turned	off.	
Source:	Ministerio	de	Justicia,	Derechos	Humanos	y	Cultos	[Ministry	of	Justice,	Human	Rights	and	Affairs]	
(2013a)	
	
The	normative	penal	device	of	the	State	Police	at	the	time	was	the	Integral	Organic	Penal	Code	
(Código	Orgánico	Integral	Penal	or	COIP),31	which	was	based	on	a	preliminary	draft	prepared	in	
2009	 but	 with	 a	more	 punitive	 twist.	 It	 brought	 together	 270	 crimes	 and	 over	 a	 100	 traffic	
violations	 within	 a	 climate	 of	 punitive	 hardening	 (see	 Table	 3).	 In	 addition,	 it	 legitimized	
undercover	 investigations	 in	 Article	 640	which	 established	 the	 so‐called	 ‘direct	 proceedings’.	
These	 proceedings	 established	 a	 10‐day	 timeframe	 to	 trial	 and	 the	 possible	 sentencing	 of	
individuals	 for	 committing	 flagrancy	 cases	 to	 a	 maximum	 punishment	 of	 five	 years’	
imprisonment.	 The	 COIP	 came	 into	 force	 on	 10	 August	 2014,	 the	 date	 that	 the	 First	 Cry	 of	
Independence	 is	 celebrated	 in	 Ecuador.	 The	 COIP	 became	 the	 penal	 symbol	 of	 the	 Citizens’	
Revolution	 because	 it	 promised	 an	 Iron	 Fist	 against	 offenders	 by	 increasing	 the	 maximum	
cumulative	sentence	to	40	years	in	prison.		
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Table	3:	Comparison	of	sentence	enforcement	between	new	and	old	criminal	laws	
Penal	Code	 Integral	Organic	Penal	Code	
ROBBERY	
1‐5	years	prison	
(Article	551)	
ROBBERY	
5‐7	years	deprivation	of	liberty	
(Article	189)	
FRAUD	
1	‐5	years	prison	
(Article	560)	
FRAUD	
5‐7	years	deprivation	of	liberty	
(Article	187)	
SEXUAL	ASSAULT	
6	months	to	2	years	prison	
(Article	511A)	
SEXUAL	ASSAULT	
1‐3	years	deprivation	of	liberty	
(Article	166)	
MURDER	
16‐25	years	imprisonment	
(Article	450)	
ASSASSINATION	
22‐26	years	deprivation	of	liberty	
(Article	143)	
Source:	Ministerio	de	Justicia,	Derechos	Humanos	y	Cultos	[Ministry	of	Justice,	Human	Rights	and	Affairs]	
(2014)		
	
However,	 a	 contradiction	 was	 presented.32	 The	 chapter	 that	 discussed	 one	 of	 the	 few	 penal	
reductions	–	but	with	a	symbolic	effect	on	international	and	domestic	policy	–	was	dismantled.	
The	COIP	had	significantly	reduced	the	sentences	 for	drug‐related	crimes	by	establishing	 four	
scales	 in	Article	220	which	broke	with	the	rigid	punitivism	of	Law	108,	 for	which	the	penalty	
historically	 had	 been	 12‐16	 years	 in	 prison.	 New	 penalties	were	 established:	 2‐6	months	 for	
trafficking	on	a	minimum	scale;	1‐3	years	for	medium‐scale	trafficking;	5‐7	years	for	trafficking	
on	a	high	scale;	and	10‐13	years	for	trafficking	on	a	large	scale.	Each	scale	had	a	threshold	based	
on	the	type	of	illicit	drug	in	relation	to	the	weight	in	grams,	in	order	to	prevent	the	criminal	justice	
system	from	applying	disproportionate	punishments	without	differentiating	between	the	types	
of	trafficking	in	which	the	offender	was	involved.	This	reform	allowed	2,148	prisoners	who	had	
been	convicted	for	drug‐related	crimes	to	regain	their	freedom,	by	virtue	of	the	application	of	the	
lenity	principle	(Defensoría	Pública	del	Ecuador	[Public	Defenders	Office]	2015).		
	
A	 year	 after	 the	 COIP	 had	 come	 into	 effect,	 President	 Rafael	 Correa	 regretted	 reducing	 the	
sentences	for	drug	related	crimes,	which	broke	with	the	consistency	generated	from	the	six	major	
steps	 that	 positioned	 the	 Ecuadorian	 policy	 as	 ‘counter‐hegemonic’.	 These	 steps	 were:	 the	
clemency	for	‘drug	mules’;	the	prohibition	of	the	criminalization	of	drug	consumers	under	Article	
364	of	the	new	Constitution;	the	refusal	to	renew	the	Advanced	Operations	Centre	of	the	United	
States	in	Manta;	the	removal	of	tariff	privileges	(ATPDEA)	in	the	US	to	maintain	the	‘war	on	drugs’	
in	Ecuador;	the	construction	of	thresholds	(tables)	to	decriminalize	drug	consumption	in	a	factual	
manner;	and	sentence	reduction	for	small	scale	traffickers	under	the	COIP.	But	the	president's	
message	was	different	this	time:	
	
Do	we	want	 to	 stop	 drug	use	 amongst	 our	 youth?	Then	 it	will	 be	 necessary	 to	
imprison	 the	 micro‐traffickers	 ...	 I	 have	 demanded	 that	 there	 will	 be	 harsher	
sanctions	 for	micro‐traffickers	 ...	 I	 have	 asked	 for	 the	 [sentencing]	 threshold	 to	
become	much	more	strict	in	cases	that	involve	H	[heroin],	which	is	destroying	our	
youth,	and	 that	 the	minimal	dose	becomes	zero.	And	even	beyond	the	 issues	of	
doses,	[the	offender]	should	go	to	 jail	 for	more	than	a	year	and	there	should	be	
preventative	detention,	so	that	these	people	won’t	return	to	the	streets	and	poison	
our	youth	...	We	will	fully	rectify	this	bad	and	mistaken	threshold	[of	trafficking],	
so	that	we	can	have	a	‘zero	tolerance’	policy	when	it	comes	to	heroin.	(El	Comercio	
2015)	
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The	counter‐reform	increased	punishments	for	drug	offenses	and	reversed	the	path	set	by	the	
government	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 prohibitionist	 paradigm	 on	 drugs	 with	 more	 proportionate	
measures.	The	strategy	once	again	became	 ‘act	 strong	against	 the	weak	and	weak	against	 the	
strong’	(Paladines	2015;	Samper	2015).	The	government	thereby	restored	the	supposed	order	in	
‘urban	pathologies’	that	point	to	the	consumption	of	drugs	as	the	central	social	issue	(Wacquant	
2013).	 The	 punitive	 increase	 in	 relation	 to	 drugs	 also	 implied	 a	 policy	 awareness	 of	 families	
suffering	from	the	drug	addictions	of	their	children,	even	though	there	is	no	solid	evidence	to	link	
these	issues	with	the	reform	that	reduced	the	punishments	at	the	time	(Paladines	2015).	
	
Conclusion:	‘There	are	no	miracles’	
The	transformation	in	Ecuador	has	been	attributed	to	the	Citizens’	Revolution	by	virtue	of	new	
economic	and	political	strategies	that	attempted	to	make	capitalism	a	more	inclusive	system.	In	
this	regard,	Ecuador	did	not	initially	present	the	economic	and	political	conditions	that	Wacquant,	
among	others,	 requires	 to	generate	a	punitive	 turn	 in	criminal	 justice	policy...	During	 the	 first	
phase	of	the	Citizens’	Revolution	punitivism	was	substantially	reduced	due	to	the	construction	of	
a	political	space	in	which	guarantee	institutions	prevailed.	In	the	second	phase	this	approach	was	
dismantled.	 The	 punitive	 turn	 of	 Ecuadorian	 left‐wing	 politics	 embodies	 a	 fundamental	
contradiction.	On	the	one	hand	it	involved	extending	social	rights	and	resisting	neoliberalism,	and	
on	the	other	intensifying	punitive	criminal	justice	policies,	which	led	to	the	increase	in	the	prison	
population	from	2010.		
	
Hence,	two	opposing	directions	presented	themselves	in	the	punitive	behaviour	of	the	Citizens’	
Revolution.	 This	 political	 division	 in	 the	 approach	 to	 crime	 control	 post‐2009	 can	 also	 be	
observed	 in	 the	 annual	 statistics	 for	 incarceration	 rates	 per	 100,000	 inhabitants.	 The	 growth	
curve	reveals	an	alarming	increase	towards	punitiveness		from	2010	onward	(see	Figure	5).	This	
means	that,	although	there	had	been	punitive	increases	before	2009,	it	is	only	from	2010	onward	
that	the	curve	shows	a	break	with	former	patterns.		
	
	
Figure	5:	Incarceration	rate	per	100,000	inhabitants	in	Ecuador	and	the	punitive	turn	of	
the	Citizen’s	Revolution	
Source:	Dirección	Nacional	de	Rehabilitación	Social	(DNRS)	(2001)		
	
Which	events	or	 scenarios	could	generate	 this	distinctive	division?	The	answer	alludes	 to	 the	
attempted	coup	on	30	September	2010	that	endangered	the	democratic	stability	of	the	country.	
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The	Citizens’	Revolution	had	changed	course.	From	this	time	on	the	punitive	turn	begins	to	take	
shape	due	to	the	aspirations	of	Ecuadorian	left‐wing	elements	who	had	seemingly	been	ignored	
by	the	government.		
	
This	 interpretation	 of	 events	 leaves	 us	 with	 many	 questions.	 Was	 the	 Iron	 Fist	 a	 deliberate	
strategy	 of	 the	 Citizens’	 Revolution	 or	was	 it	 a	 response	 to	 an	 insecurity	 crisis	without	 clear	
objectives?	Were	economic	analysts	not	concerned	with	the	construction	of	a	punitive	agenda	
and	left	it	to	its	own	device?	Did	the	modernization	of	the	state	increase	the	performance	or	delays	
of	the	prison	system?	Is	it	smart	to	maintain	Iron	Fist	policies	for	the	next	elections	(to	win	votes)?	
The	 State	 repression	 is	 independent	 of	 the	 economic	model	 so	 do	 approaches	 to	 punitivism	
influence	the	economy?	Is	the	punitive	increase	a	moral	punishment	for	the	citizens	who	did	not	
adopt	Citizens’	Revolution	values?	Is	punitivism	corporatized	by	the	agencies	that	resist	change?	
Did	Ecuador	never	leave	neoliberalism	to	begin	with	or	did	it	return	to	it	by	means	of	the	punitive	
shift?	In	an	effort	to	promote	further	discussions,	and	by	way	of	conclusion,	I	will	try	to	answer	
each	of	these	questions.	
	
If	the	quality	of	democracy	is	measured	by	the	ability	of	the	State	to	provide	public	safety,	then	
policy	responds	to	the	population’s	need	to	feel	more	secure.	The	adoption	of	more	repressive	
methods	is	often	characterized	as	the	best	way	to	achieve	this.	Therefore,	any	action	that	finds	
the	subjective	public	safety	of	its	inhabitants	in	increased	incarceration	rates	is	deliberate.	Hence,	
the	increase	of	crime	poses	a	threat	to	a	government’s	stability	and	creates	a	space	in	which	Iron	
Fist	policies	become	more	popular,	both	among	the	rich	and	the	poor.	
	
The	 government	 of	 Rafael	 Correa	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 efficient	 team	 of	
economists	 who	 had	 no	 presence	 in	 criminal	 policy	 decisions.	 There	 was	 therefore	 no	 deep	
ideological	connection	about	the	role	of	 institutions	of	punishment	in	the	Citizens’	Revolution,	
which	suggests	that	there	was	no	coherent	anti‐neoliberal	discourse	in	both	the	judicial	reform	
and	the	Public	Safety	Program.	
	
The	Citizens’	Revolution	focused	on	State	recovery	in	its	political	program.	This	was	carried	out	
by	 the	modernization	of	penal	 institutions	 through	costly	 infrastructure	 for	courts	and	by	 the	
introduction	 of	 Flagrancy	 Units.	 Accordingly,	 penitentiary	 modernization	 had	 never	 been	 as	
visible	 as	during	 two	governmental	 terms.	The	 first	was	 that	 of	 the	ultraconservative	Gabriel	
García	Moreno	(1859‐1875);	and	the	second	that	of	President	Rafael	Correa	Delgado	(2007	to	
present).	Instead	of	reflecting	upon	the	potential	effect	of	having	more	prisons,	construction	was	
boosted	to	levels	that	had	never	been	seen	before.	This	occurred	as	part	of	the	baroque	politics	
at	 the	 time	 (Echeverría	 1998:	 48),	 meaning	 politics	 operated	 under	 the	 belief	 system	 that	
punishment	 will	 ‘continue	 to	 be	 good’.	 The	 maintenance	 and	 upgrading	 of	 the	 prison	
infrastructure	responds	to	a	medieval	political	pathology	to	isolate	the	‘bad’	from	the	‘good’.	Thus	
the	request	for	a	general	amnesty	of	prisoners,	after	the	visit	of	Pope	Francisco	to	Ecuador,	was	
not	accepted	by	the	government,	even	though	they	had	been	granted	during	the	pope’s	visits	to	
Bolivia	and	Cuba.	
	
The	 government	 of	 Rafael	 Correa	 has	 also	 been	 characterized	 by	 decision‐making	 through	
opinion	polls,	a	political	marketing	tool	that	had	generated	him	electoral	gain.	However,	passing	
all	policies	through	opinion	polls	can	also	mortgage	any	idea	for	change.	It	is	possible	that	the	
phase	 of	 punitive	 increase	 that	 passed	 through	 Ecuador	 found	 support	 in	 the	 culture	 of	
punishment	of	 its	 inhabitants,	who	in	the	end	register	their	sense	of	(in)security	to	reward	or	
punish	with	their	votes.	In	other	words,	any	Iron	Fist	decision	is	believed	to	be	supported	in	the	
electorate.	However,	there	is	no	correlation	between	punitivity	and	providing	a	sense	of	security	
to	society	as	revealed	in	the	polls	and	(lack	of)	loyalty	of	the	electorate	to	a	political	party.	The	
recent	sectional	elections	of	February	2014	showed	that	governments	–	even	with	a	large	penal	
apparatus	 aimed	 at	 providing	 public	 safety	 and	 decreasing	 homicide	 rates	 –	 can	 still	 lose,	 as	
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happened	with	the	electoral	defeat	in	many	districts	including	the	capital	of	the	republic	and	the	
country's	largest	city,	Guayaquil.	
	
Punitivism	is	not	a	phenomenon	that	can	simply	be	explained	by	economic	variables.	Even	though	
the	 Citizen’s	 Revolution	 was	 expressed	 through	 strong	 programs	 that	 reduced	 the	 levels	 of	
inequality	 and	 poverty,	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 were	 ‘less	 poor’	 did	 not	 generate	 patterns	 of	
decarceration.	On	the	contrary,	with	an	interesting	socio‐economic	program	that	aimed	to	reduce	
poverty	and	inequality,	the	Citizen’s	Revolution	also	generated	increasing	incarceration	rates	at	
a	level	that	had	never	been	seen	before.	It	could	be	argued	that	penal	institutions	thus	fulfilled	an	
efficient	 role	 in	 avoiding	 impunity.	 However,	 the	 number	 of	 incarcerated	 individuals	 can	 not	
necessarily	be	explained	by	this	logic,	but	rather	by	the	possible	dysfunction	of	penal	institutions	
that	 do	 not	 stop,	 but	 rather	 increase,	 selective	 imprisonment.	 This	 could	 be	 clarified	 by	 the	
following	simple	metaphor:	the	best	hospital	is	not	the	one	that	cures	most	patients	but,	rather,	
the	one	that	prevents	more	diseases.	
	
One	of	the	latent	dilemmas	of	this	work	–	which,	for	the	time	being,	does	not	allow	any	claims	to	
be	made	–	 is	 to	know	whether	 improvement	 in	 the	conditions	of	 the	 lives	of	Ecuadorians	has	
created	a	zero	tolerance	climate	in	relation	to	crime.	The	very	term	‘crime’	is	related	to	the	social	
imaginaries	 which	 are	 also	 portrayed	 daily	 through	 media	 sources,	 in	 which	 crimes	 against	
property	are	highlighted	more	than	other	types	of	crimes.	So,	because	of	the	growth	of	the	middle	
class,	it	now	represents	a	greater	purchasing	power	as	a	proportion	of	society.	Therefore	the	idea	
of	‘the	good	life’	becomes	more	distant	from	the	notion	of	solidarity	which	is	related	to	socialism;	
rather,	it	presents	as	a	way	to	defend	private	property	at	any	cost	and	to	punish	those	who	seek	
to	snatch	their	unbridled	capitalism.	
	
Proposals	to	reduce	punitivism	were	met	with	differing	positions	within	the	same	government.	
This	suggests	that	criminal	policy	is	a	battlefield	when	attempting	to	defuse	the	punitive	climate.	
The	agency	that	stands	out	within	the	Iron	Fist	political	climate	is	the	Police.	That	also	allows	us	
to	observe	its	corporate	character;	that	is	to	say,	the	defense	of	their	interests	in	the	field	of	citizen	
security	 after	 30	 September	 2010	 in	which	 the	 logic	 to	 arrest	was	 confirmed	 by	 the	 logic	 to	
sentence.	 This	 is	 where	 the	 government	 possibly	 did	 not	 sufficiently	 consider	 recognised	
concepts	 in	 order	 to	 refocus	 criminal	 policy,	 especially	 after	 having	 given	 the	 security	
management	to	a	ministry	that	was	responsible	for	functions	of	the	same	agency.	In	addition,	it	
does	not	seem	that	there	has	been	an	exhaustive	police	reform	in	Ecuador;	for	example,	there	
have	been	only	a	few	reforms	in	relation	to	police	personnel.33	
	
Finally,	the	binary	code	neoliberalism/socialism	of	the	twenty‐first	century	reflects	a	break	with	
the	 past.	 If,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 socialism	 in	 the	 twenty‐first	 century	 is	 a	 leap	 towards	 a	more	
inclusive	society,	then	the	ongoing	increase	in	the	incarceration	rate	creates	the	notion	that	there	
are	 still	 individuals	 that	 are	 excluded.	However,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	Citizens’	Revolution’s	
punitive	discourse	reveals	a	code	of	inclusion/exclusion,	sparking	suspicions	that	neoliberalism	
might	not	be	completely	something	of	the	past.		
	
Five	years	after	30	September	2010,	 the	 international	price	of	a	barrel	of	oil	plummeted.34	 In	
order	to	deal	with	the	crisis	the	government	began	to	look	to	the	International	Monetary	Fund	to	
apply	for	credit.	This	created	room	for	the	classic	neoliberal	recipes,	such	as	the	privatization	of	
profitable	public	enterprises	and	the	elimination	of	State	subsidies.35	Despite	the	downturn	and	
the	 crisis,	 the	 Citizens’	 Revolution	 maintained	 that	 the	 distribution	 of	 wealth	 continued	 to	
improve,	 even	 though	 it	 had	 created	 the	 need	 to	 govern	 the	 poor	 by	 way	 of	 punishment	
(Wacquant	2013).	Thus	the	most	important	characteristic	of	neoliberalism,	where	the	police	and	
penitentiary		remain	the	only	institutions	that	will	never	be	dismantled	(Escalante	2015),	persists	
in	Ecuador.	
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1	I	appreciate	the	selfless	help	of	Max	Paredes	for	the	development	of	the	quantitative	information	as	well	as	the	patient	
and	substantiated	observations	from	Máximo	Sozzo.	
2	This	article	was	originally	published	in	Spanish	(available	at	
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20160404115404/Postneoliberalismo_penalidad.pdf)	and	was	translated	
for	this	special	issue.	
3	In	1996,	during	the	administration	of	President	Sixto	Durán	Ballén,	a	neoliberal	model	was	implemented	that	was	
characterized	by	the	adoption	of	the	famous	State	Modernization	laws,	better	known	as	‘Trolley	1’	and	‘Trolley	2’.	
4	The	new	Code	of	Criminal	Procedure	came	into	force	in	January	2000.	
5	As	a	symbol	of	good	relations	with	the	United	States,	its	embassy	in	Quito	gave	their	traditional	building	located	on	
‘Av.	Patria	y	12	de	Octubre’	to	the	Attorney	General	of	Ecuador,	during	Washington	Pesantez	presidential	term.	
6	 Art.	 2	 [Law	 No.	 2001‐47].	 Replaced	 Article	 53	 [Criminal	 Code],	 by	 the	 following:	 ‘Art.	 53.	 The	 long‐term	
imprisonments,	which	are	carried	out	in	the	State	Social	Rehabilitation	Centers,	are	divided	into:	a)	ordinary,	4‐8	
years	and	8‐12	years;	b)	extraordinary,	12‐16	years;	and	c)	special,	from	16‐25	years	[emphasis	added]’.	
7	Amendment	to	Article	513	of	the	Penal	Code	published	in	the	Official	Register	No.	45	of	23	June	2005.	
8	The	pressure	of	the	media	has	conditioned	much	of	the	legislative	work,	both	in	the	long	neoliberal	night	and	the	
Citizens’	Revolution	(see	Paladines	2008).	
9	Resolution	No.	002‐2005‐TC	published	in	the	Supplement	of	the	Official	Register	No.	382	of	23	October	2006.	
10For	the	 first	 time	persons	deprived	of	 their	 liberty	were	recognised	as	a	priority	group	under	the	constitution	 in	
Ecuador,	as	stated	in	Article	51.	
11The	2006	presidential	elections	were	established	through	a	ballot.	 In	the	 first	round,	 the	billionaire	businessman	
Alvaro	Noboa	took	first	place	with	26	per	cent	of	the	vote.	However,	in	the	second	round	Rafael	Correa	won	with	a	
majority	of	56.67	per	cent	of	the	valid	votes.		
12With	regard	to	the	pardons	for	drug	related	crimes,	Ecuador	was	one	of	the	pioneers	in	2008,	followed	by	Peru	in	
2009,	Bolivia	in	2013	and	the	United	States	in	2014.	
13In	2008,	between	65	and	79	per	cent	of	the	total	female	prison	population	was	detained	for	drug	offenses	(Edwards	
2010).	
14On	14	April	2007,	Rafael	Correa	publicly	announced	the	arrest	of	his	father	as	a	teenager	for	drug	trafficking	in	the	
United	States.	See:	
http://www.eluniverso.com/2007/12/22/0001/8/19541214074D4DD1AC8D68AF2EB764F7.html.	
15The	new	constitution	created	penitentiary	judiciary	guarantees	(Art.	203)	and	recognized	the	power	of	indigenous	
justice	to	resolve	conflicts	(Art.	171).	
16The	Ministry	of	Justice	and	Human	Rights	of	Ecuador	(now	also	of	Religious	Affairs)	has,	since	its	creation,	had	as	its	
Minister,	 Gustavo	 Jalkh	 (2007‐2009),	 Nestor	 Arbito	 (2009‐2010),	 José	 Serrano	 (2010‐2012),	 Johanna	 Heaviness	
(2012‐2013),	Lenin	Lara	(2013‐2014)	and	Ledy	Zúñiga	(2014),	who	is	the	current	Minister.	
17By	 presidential	 decree	 305,	 Rafael	 Correa	 created	 the	 Truth	 Commission	 on	 the	 3	 May	 2007	 with	 the	 aim	 to	
investigate	and	clarify	 the	violent	acts	and	violations	against	human	rights,	 specifically	between	1984	and	1988,	
which	is	the	governmental	period	of	President	Leon	Febres	Cordero.	Between	1984	and	2008	the	Truth	Commission	
recorded	118	cases,	bringing	together	456	victims	of	which	269	were	illegally	deprived	of	their	liberty,	365	were	
victims	of	torture,	86	were	victims	of	sexual	violence,	26	had	experienced	attacks	against	their	life,	68	were	victims	
of	extrajudicial	executions	and	17	were	victims	of	enforced	disappearances.	Of	these,	68	per	cent	occurred	during	the	
governmental	period	of	Febres	Cordero	(Comisión	de	la	Verdad	(Truth	Commission	2010).	
18Before	2009	there	were	44	amendments	to	the	criminal	code	and	13	to	the	new	New	Criminal	Procedural	Code	of	
2000.	
19The	assembly	members	of	the	Civil	and	Penal	Commission	who	promoted	the	reform	were:	Mauro	Andino,	Rosana	
Alvarado,	 Vicente	 Taiano,	 Félix	 Alcívar,	 Teresa	 Benavidez,	 Julio	 Logroño,	 Cesar	 Gracia	 and	 María	 Paula	 Romo,	
president	of	the	commission.	
20The	current	Attorney	General's	Office	has	been	emphatic	in	pointing	out	the	inappropriate	data	collection	after	30	
September	2010,	due	to	the	subordination	of	the	State	Prosecutors	Office	to	the	Police.	In	other	words	there	has	been	
an	apparent	lack	of	impartiality	of	police	officers,	which	has	been	termed	the	‘colonization	of	researchers’	(Fiscalía	
General	del	Estado	(State	Attorney	General)	2015:	140).	
21The	government	of	Rafael	Correa	began	a	nationwide	process	of	devolution	of	powers,	whose	normative	symbol	is	
called	the	Organic	Code	of	Territorial	Organization,	Autonomy	and	Decentralization	(OCTOAD).	Through	this	law,	the	
police	 legally	ceased	to	maintain	competition	 in	the	 field	of	 transit.	Nevertheless,	 the	Ecuadorian	police	has	been	
characterized	as	being	elephantine,	meaning,	to	concentrate	on	many	functions.	Namely,	the	police	held	community	
policing	functions	(UPC);	National	Traffic	Police	(PNT);	counter‐narcotics	police	(DNA);	Judicial	Police	(PJ);	Police	for	
boys,	girls	and	adolescents	(DINAPEN);	in	addition	to	elite	groups	such	as	GIR,	GEMA,	ULCO,	GOE	and	CMO.	
22To	read	more	about	the	press	releases,	see	for	example	the	newspaper	El	Comercio,	Judicial	Writing,	‘Most	theft	cases	
end	in	impunity’,	published	21	April	2009.	
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23See	http://www.lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/860720/‐1/home/goRegional/Quito#.Vb82jP2HfIU.	
24See:	http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/noticias/informacion‐general/item/gobierno‐reflexiona‐reforma‐constitucional‐
por‐hipergarantismo.html	(accessed	28	September	2012).	
25José	Serrano	Salgado	is	a	lawyer	from	the	city	of	Cuenca.	During	his	youth	he	was	active	in	the	Socialist	Party	and	
created	Human	Rights	defense	groups.	Before	becoming	part	of	the	Interior	portfolio,	and	during	the	government	of	
Rafael	 Correa,	 he	 was	 the	 deputy	 secretary	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Non‐Renewable	 Natural	 Resources,	 Secretary	 of	
Transparency	(anti‐corruption)	and	Minister	of	Justice.	In	the	Interior	Ministry	he	developed	reward	scheme	to	locate	
fugitives.	The	‘Most	Wanted’	Campaign	consisted	of	a	plan	to	create	financial	incentives	for	any	individual	that	would	
provide	information	–	informants	reward	–	that	contributed	to	the	arrest	of	sought	individuals	by	law	enforcement	
agencies,	 even	 though	 some	 of	 them	 had	 no	 formal	 conviction.	 This	 campaign	 was	 also	 characterized	 by	 the	
publishing	of	fugitives’	photos	along	with	their	epithets	or	alias,	even	to	the	point	of	classifying	individuals	into	‘race’	
categories.	See:	http://www.ministeriointerior.gob.ec/tag/los‐mas‐buscados/	(accessed	4	May	2013).	
26See:	 http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/01/09/1/1355/si‐queremos‐meter‐manos‐cortes.html	 (accessed	 17	
December	2011).	The	reform	and	the	judicial	policy	was	questioned	about	its	independence	in	a	controversial	study	
by	Luis	Pásara,	with	the	title	‘The	judicial	Independence	of	the	Ecuadorian	justice	reform’	(2014).	
27Part	 of	 the	 coordination	 of	 law	 enforcement	 agencies,	 with	 judges	 in	 the	 Flagrancy	 Units,	 is	 dependent	 on	 new	
information	and	communication	technologies	 implemented	 in	 the	 fight	against	crime.	 In	 late	2011,	 the	expensive	
‘Integrated	Security	Service	ECU‐911’	was	implemented	under	the	concept	of	‘integral	security’.	The	operation	of	the	
National	 Police,	 the	 Armed	 Forces,	 the	 Fire	 Departments,	 the	 National	 Commission	 of	 Ground	 Transit	 and	
Transportation,	the	Ministry	of	Public	Health,	the	Ecuadorian	Social	Security	Institute,	the	National	Secretariat	for	
Risk	Management,	 the	Ecuadorian	Red	Cross	and	other	 local	 bodies	 responsible	 for	dealing	with	 emergencies	of	
citizenship	were	brought	together	under	this	service.	
28The	methodology	to	calculate	 the	homicide	rate	has	not	been	made	public.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	unknown	whether	the	
construction	of	this	information	comes	from	autopsy	reports,	death	certificates,	tax	instructions,	court	rulings,	press	
reports	or	police	reports.	
29	ee:	http://www.ministeriointerior.gob.ec/36167/	(accessed	18	March	2015).	
30	The	current	Minister	of	Justice,	Ledy	Zúñiga	said	that	overcrowding	was	reduced	to	0.24	per	cent	in	the	last	four	
years,	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 prisons.	 See:	 http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/justicia/item/el‐
hacinamiento‐carcelario‐se‐redujo‐a‐024‐en‐4‐anos.html	(accessed	26	March	2015).	
31The	COIP	was	published	in	the	Supplement	of	the	Official	Register	No.	180	of	10	February	2014	and	came	into	full	
effect	on	10	August	of	the	same	year.	
32Since	the	start	of	reform	that	reduced	drug	penalties	in	the	COIP,	the	State	remained	divided.	The	body	responsible	
for	drug	policy	(CONSEP),	the	Ministry	of	Health	and	the	Public	Defender’s	Office,	were	at	the	forefront	of	reform.	It	
also	focused	on	underscoring	the	delays	that	occurred	in	the	release	of	the	persons	who	were	eligible	for	the	lenity	
principle	or	the	more	benign	subsequent	law	(See	Paladines	2014b:	7‐12).	
33In	recent	years	some	‘institutional	cleansing’	processes	have	been	developed	within	the	police.	However,	with	a	police	
force	 of	 over	 40,000	 employees,	 it	 has	 not	 been	 a	 complete	 reform,	 but	 rather	 waves	 of	 layoffs	 related	 to	 the	
corruption	 allegations	 by	 the	 Minister	 of	 the	 Interior.	 See:	 http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/policia‐baja‐
uniformados‐ecuador‐ministeriointerior.html	(accessed	10	July	2014).	
34See:	 http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2015/09/24/nota/5144378/correa‐yo‐siempre‐dije‐que‐economia‐no‐
hay‐milagros	(accessed	24	September	2015).		
35See:	 http://www.elcomercio.com/tv/gobierno‐alianza‐publico‐privada‐inversion.html	 (accessed	 25	 November	
2015).	
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